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COMMENT
LABOR ACTIVITIES AND ANTI-MONOPOLY LEGISLATION
The uproar of the ancient market place was the symbol of competition until contemporary times. Each purchase or barter was a thing
of its own; each buyer was to be treated according to "what this part of
the traffic will bear"; each seller was to be heckled until the price would
be cut no lower. Although "survival of the fittest" was the keyword, by
and large the majority survived.
Contrary to popular opinion, however, history has numerous examples
of ancient and semi-modern attempts to control some of the unwanted
effects of the competitive system.- Furthermore, while early civilizations may have agreed in practice, the doctrine of laissez faire did not
get a firm foothold until the end of the 18th century.2 The United
States started its great century of expansion under the political and
governmental philosophy of "hands off", and until 1890 unrestricted
free competition had a fine opportunity to demonstrate its over-all
results. Men discovered not only that too few were proving themselves
fit in some industries, but that, horrible as it seemed to the advocate
of free competition, the healthier boys were making agreements not to
fight with one another. Mr. Business Without Restriction had to be
prosecuted. He was not jailed, but was paroled in the care of the Sherman Act. This was our first important governmental control which
aimed to foster free competition and, in a broad sense, the beginning
of a series of Congressional paradoxes.3
The vital language of the Sherman Act is a summary itself, and so
must be set out in full. This is all it says:
"Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce among
the several States, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared
to be illegal . . ."I

Does this very short Congressional sentence have any impact upon
the activities of organized labor?

The words "combination . . . in

:'McAllister, Price Control by Law in the U. S. (1937) 4

LAW & CoN-

TEMvn. PROB. 273, 274.

WEALTH OF NATIONS by Adam Smith was published in 1776.
3 Academically, one can argue over the meaning of the word "competition." It may mean complete freedom of action by business approaching the
laissez faire doctrine. Then, any statute that tries to help competition
paradoxically is a control of competition. Or it may be just a distributive
system whereby each individual tries to outdo his competitors but only
under a set of rules. Thus the Sherman Act makes a rule against a group
combining to squeeze out another competitor, or a combination to maintain
prices. The Robinson-Patman Act keeps the teams "on-side" by making
illegal much of the buyer's competition in the purchasing market.
4 26 Stat. 209; 15 U. S. C. A. Sec. 1. The brevity of the statute has led
many respectable authorities to contend that the Act is merely an expression of congressional policy-a condemnation of improper practices
in a competitive system. This theory suggests an extremely liberal con2The

struction, and, as will be seen later, has been an important philosophy of

Mr. Thurman Arnold. See discussion, infra page 212.
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illegal" certainly suggest that labor
restaint of trade or commerce
unions, which aim to control the supply of labor and thereby increase
wages through collective bargaining, violate the Sherman Act by their
very existence and purpose. By the twentieth century, however, all
courts recognized the propriety of organizing labor to improve wages,
hours, and working conditions. To insure an interpretation of the
Sherman Act in accord with this prevalent attitude, Congress made the
following declaration in 1914:
"The labor of a human being is not a commodity or article
of commerce. Nothing contained in the anti-trust laws shall
be construed to forbid the existence and operation of labor...
organizations, instituted for the purposes of mutual help, and
not having capital stock or conducted for profit,5 or to forbid
or restrain individual members of such organizations from
lawfully carrying out the legitimate objects thereof; nor shall
such organization . . .be held . . .to be illegal combinations

in restraint of trade...-.6
Since organization by peaceful means7 for mutual help was a legitimate object of labor unions, the danger that collective bargaining by
strong unions would violate the Sherman Act was minimized.
The Clayton Act also contained an anti-injunction section which
forbade the issuance of an injunction "in any case between an employer
and employees . . .or between persons employing and persons seeking

employment.. . growing out of a dispute concerning the terms or conditions of employment." The statute specified proper means to be
used by labor, such as peaceful picketing, strikes, primary boycotts,
and assemblies, and a catch-all clause removed such activities from the
reach of the Sherman Act by declaring: "nor shall any of the acts specified in this paragraph be considered or held to be violations of any laws
of the United States.""
These were the pertinent sections of the statutes on the books when
the courts began to consider the applicability of anti-monopoly legislation to labor unions and their activities. Let us now examine the treatment of these Congressional mandates by the Supreme Court of the
United States.
THE EARLY CASES DISAPPOINT LABOR
The Sherman Act imposes three sanctions on illegal restraints of trade
or commerce-the injunction, criminal prosecution, and treble damages
actions. The Supreme Court's first consideration of the applicability
of the Act to labor activities involved an action for damages. In the
Danbury Hatters case,9 the Court ruled that pressure upon purchasers
of the employer's hats interfered with interstate sales, for the secondary
boycott not only cut down the interstate shipments of the manufacturer,
but also interfered with the employer's access to an outstate market.
The Court simply inferred an intent to restrain inter-state commerce.
The writer has found no cases where a labor union has been held to
be outside the protection of this section because of high dues-dues so high
that the leaders might be charged with conducting the union for profit.
8 38 Stat. 731; 15 U. S. C. A. See. 17.
7Cf. Hitchman Coal Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U. S. 229 62 L. Ed. 260, 38 S. Ct.
65 (1917)-ilegal to induce breach of a yellow dog contract.
S38 Stat. 738; 29 U. S. C. A. Sec. 52.
Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U. S. 274 52 L. Ed. 488, 28 S. Ct. 301 (1908).
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The Danbury Hatters case was before the Clayton Act of 1914, and
labor hoped that this statute would lead the Court to reconsider, and
to hold that the Sherman Act was inapplicable to all labor activities.
Seven years after the passage of the Clayton Act this hope was dashed
in Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering.10 New York workmen refused
to aid in the installation of the products of a Michigan employer in an
effort to force their own employer to withdraw patronage from this
non-union company. The Court characterized their activities as a sympathetic strike in aid of a secondary boycott which was not "peaceful
and lawful persuasion" under the Clayton Act, declared that the secondary boycott was not one of the means sanctified by Section 20 of
the statute, and found that no labor dispute existed between the New
York workmen and the out-of-state employer because the relation of
employer-employee was absent. Finally, the Court held that Section 6
of the Clayton Act did nothing except state what had always been true
-that unions could engage in lawful activity to carry out their legitimate objects." The boycott was enjoined, and labor discovered that
their protective Clayton Act leaked like a sieve hit by a shotgun.
Justice Brandeis wrote a now famous dissent in the Duplex case,
arguing for a liberal interpretation of the Clayton Act. Since the secondary boycott was part of a dispute between labor and capital, it
grew out of a "dispute concerning the terms or conditions of employment"1 2 and was not enjoinable, for the catch-all clause of Section 20
prevented injunctions under the Sherman Act as well as prohibiting
restraining orders in general. The Court, however, was not ready to
accept this interpretation in 1927, and in Bedford Cut Stone v. Journeymen Stone Cutters 3 an injunction against the refusal of workmen to
work on stone coming from a non-union, out-of-state quarry was declared proper. The Duplex interpretation of the Clayton Act was
affirmed. Of course, Justice Brandeis dissented, and said that he would
have the Court examine the degree to which the activity in question
promoted the self-interest of labor and balance that against the weight
of employer opposition and the necessities of the case.
The DanburyHatters, Duplex, and Bedford cases all involved activity
aimed at the marketing or use of interstate goods, and all three cases
discovered a direct restraint on commerce.' 4 When confronted with a
labor controversy which centered in the production of goods travelling
in interstate commerce, the Court started to talk about intent. The
First Coronado"-case concerned a strike, coupled with violence, in a
non-union mine. The end sought was a closed shop. Large quantities
of interstate shipments of coal were held up, but the Court held that
this restraint on commerce was only "indirect." The primary concern
of the workers was improvement of local conditions, and the effect on
interstate commerce only incidental. Since no showing was made that
10254

U. S. 443 65 L. Ed. 349, 41 S. Ct. 172 (1921).
1Cf Tunks, A New Federal Charter for Trade Unionism (1941) 41
COL. L. REV. 969, 974.
1Section 20 of the Clayton Act, set out supra, page 207.
1"274 U. S. 37, 71 L. Ed. 916, 47 S. Ct. 522 (1927).
14 See also U. S. v. Painters' Council, 44 F. (2d) 58
(C. C. A. 7th, 1930)
aff'd without opinion, 284 U. S.582, 76 L. Ed. 504, 52 S. Ct. 38 (1931).
15United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U. S.344, 66 L. Ed.
975, 42 S.Ct. 570 (1922).
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the union wanted to control the entire industry-a national closed shop
-the "incidental" effects of purely local controversies would not violate
the Sherman Act.16
Plaintiff's attorneys took the cue, and proceeded to get evidence
against the union which showed that the end sought was to keep all
non-union coal off the market.1 7 In the Second Coronado' case, the
Court looked at this evidence, found an intent to restrain interstate
commerce as well as the actual restraint present in the First case, and
granted the injunction.
One more case by way of background for the subsequent discussion
of the recent attitudes of the Supreme Court toward labor and antimonopoly legislation is United States v. Brims 9 which case found capital and labor conspiring to tie up the building trades. A three-way contract was made between contractor, mills, and the union, whereby the
contractors would hire only union men, the union men would work only
on wood from union mills, and the mills would hire only union help.
Non-union wood was effectively blocked from the local market. The
Court quickly declared that a combination in restraint of trade and
commerce existed.
Roughly, these early cases can be placed in three groups: the boycott
casesi affecting commerce at the end of its journey; 2 0 the strike and
picket cases, affecting commerce before it starts; 2 , and the joinder of
capital and labor in restraint of trade. 22 The second group seemed to
require intent; the other two must have just assumed it since the means
were improper. Thus the Sherman Act could be violated by improper
purpose or improper means. Not until the late thirties was another
approach brought forth-an approach that looked toward the effect of
the labor activity upon the competitive structure, and ignored both the
end and the means.-.
THE Ai'xx CASE
Labor has always been irritated by the application of the Sherman
Act to its activities, 24 and in Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader25 the attorneys
for the union attacked a complain, for treble damages strongly on the
10 See also United Leather Workers v. Herkert and Meisel Trunk Co.,
265 U. S. 457, 68 L. Ed. 1104, 44 S. Ct. 623 (1924). Cf. Levering iand Gar-

rigues Co. v. Morrin, 289 U. S. 103, 77 L. Ed. 1062, 53 S. Ct. 549 (1933).
See Tunks, supranote 11, n. 40.
17The union could survive only if all coal was dug at high wages
because non-union coal was driving the market price so low that employers
in union mines would go broke if they continued to pay union wages.
' Coronado Coal Co. v. U. S., 268 U. S. 295, 69 L. Ed. 963, 45 S. Ct. 551
(1925).
19 272 U. $. 549, 71 L. Ed. 403, 47 S. Ct. 169 (1926).
20

Danbury Hatters,Duplex and Bedford cases, supra notes 9, 10, 13.

211Coronado cases, supra notes 15, 18.
22 Brims case, supra note 19.
23 Apex Hosiery v. Leader, 310 U. S. 469, 84 L. Ed. 1311, 60 S. Ct. 982
(1940), infra page 210 et seq.
2
1See 51 CONG. REc. 9538 et seq. (1914) for debate on Clayton Act.
See also: Boudin, The Sherman Act and Labor Disputes (1939), 39 COL.
L. R v. 1283, (1940) 40 COL. L. REv. 14; Teller, Federal Intervention in
Labor Disputes and Collective Bargaining-The Hutcheson Case (1941)
40 McH. L. REv. 24, 31.

25310 U. S. 469, 84 L. Ed. 1311, 60 S. Ct. 982 (1940).
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ground that the Sherman Act was inapplicable to labor controveries.
The Hosiery Company was a large producer of silk stockings and shipped
the majority of its finished pieces in interstate commerce. Only a few
of its employees belonged to the Full-Fashioned Hosiery Workers' Union,
and when the company refused to enter a closed shop agreement with
that organization, a strike was ordered. Members of the union entered
the plant and "sat down." Not only the few employee members took
over the plant, but also many non-employee members joined them, and
the multitude effectively damaged the plant equipment and prevented
plant operation for two months. They refused the company permission
to ship already finished goods on existing orders. The Supreme Court,
speaking through Mr. Justice Stone, declared that the Sherman Act
was applicable to labor in "some" circumstances, but proceeded to hold
that the statute interdicts only those labor activities which injure the
competitive system by controlling the market, restricting
production, or
26
raising prices to the detriment of the consumer.
The opinion is a study in technique. The Court says one thing, but
proceeds to hold to the contrary; i. e., labor is covered by the Sherman
Act, but since the Sherman Act condemns only those activities which
injure competition substantially, as a practical matter, labor is almost
exempt from its provisions. This approach is reminiscent of Chief
Justice Marshall, who would say one thing to prevent present criticism,
and then proceed to leave a foundation for subsequent holdings contrary
to the ideas of his appeased criticizers.27 Furthermore, although the
opinion in the Apex case appears to affirm earlier holdings, the test laid
down by the Court and Justice Stone would not lead to the same result
today upon litigation of the identical facts involved in those cases
affirmed.
Let us examine some of the postulates set forth by Justice Stone. The
sit-down
strike had previously been declared illegal by the Supreme
Court,28 but Mr. Stone met this troublesome fact simply by saying that
the means used by labor are immaterial in a consideration of the applicability of the Sherman Act. Although the means may have been
improper, treble damages will be allowed only when the effect of the
activity is to injure competition substantially. The boycott cases, however, are affirmed. Those opinions, 29 as will be recalled, frowned upon
the use of a secondary boycott. The Court said nothing about the
effect of the labor activity, because it was looking at the means. The
opinions assumed that any restraint upon commerce was improper if
the pressures used on an employer were "naughty." Furthermore, the
facts in those cases did not show a substantial impediment to free competition. Under the test of the Apex case, where effect is the only
determinative factor, labor would win in a "re-hearing" of the sec26 This is the language of the opinion: "The end sought [by the Sherman
Act] was the prevention of restraint to free competition in business and
commercial transactions which tended to restrict production, raise prices,
or otherwise control the market to the detriment of purchasers or consumers of goods and services." 310 U. S. 469 at 493, 84 L. Ed. 1311, 60 S. Ct.
982 (1940). See Tunks, supra note 11 at 974.
21Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803).
28 Comment (1940) 35 ILL. L. REV. 424, 426.
2"Note 20, supra. (Danbury Hatters, Duplex, Bedford).
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2
ondary boycott cases. 91

Not only the means used, but also the purposes of the union pressure
were discarded as tests. The Coronado cases" said that effect upon
interstate commerce was immaterial, if, the purpose was merely local;
but that if the purpose was to restrain commerce nationally-to preclude
non-union goods from entering the market-then the Act was violated.
Compare the approach of Justice Stone. For him, effect is everything,
and that effect must be much more than merely an impediment to inter-,
state shipment. The Union can openly intend to prevent interstate
shipments, but unless that intention is successful to the point of tying
up markets and injuring consumers, no violation of the Sherman Act
will result.1
The earlier opinions of the Court read the language "in restraint of
trade or commerce" literally in the disjunctive, and a blocking of interstate shipments was in "restraint of... commerce." If the activity was
a secondary boycott, it was assumed that the intent was present to
restrain commerce by preventing sales-in fact, the Court just didn't
talk about intent.3 2 When, however, the union pressure, such as a
primary strike or picketing, struck at the production end of the interstate journey, the Court realized that "something new must be added";
otherwise, every strike would violate the Sherman Act. It can be argued
that the intent doctrine was evolved to justify strikes for proper local
purposes and to condemn activities aimed at national union power.33
The contrast of Justice Stone's approach is striking. By looking at the
intent of Congress in passing the Sherman Act, he concluded that
"restraint of trade or commerce" should be read together. Monopoly
was the evil sought to be eradicated by Congress. Common law principles of restraint of trade were in mind. There was no though of prosecuting injuries to interstate commerce through a monopoly statute;
"commerce" was either surplusage or synonymous with "trade." If the
Hosiery Company, therefore, had argued the presence of a "national
intent" in the Apex case, it is submitted that this "improper" purpose
of the sit-downers would have been immaterial, and the result of the
case the same. The intent ideas of the Coronado cases are gone.34
The Court also had to deal with N. L. R. B. v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp.35 which held that Congress has power under the commerce
clause to legislate with reference to local strikes and other union activities which affect interstate commerce-production is a part of interstate
29,
Accord: U. S. v. Gold, 115 F. (2d) 236 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1940); Int. Garm.
Wks.
3 0 v. Donnelly, 4 L. C., § 60530 (1941).
Notes 15, 18, supra.
3
1Of course, common law remedies available in state courts are still
open to the employer, but not treble damages in the federal courts. The
Sherman Act is inapplicable, and no federal question is involved.
32 Danbury Hatters, Duplex and Bedford cases, supra notes 9, 10, 13.
"3Gregory, The Sherman Act v. Labor (1941) 8 U. OF Cm. L. REV. 222,
228. See also: Gregory, Labor's Coercive Activities under the Sherman Act
-The Apex Case, 7 U. OF CHI . REv. 347 (1940).
3Cf. Teller, supra note 24 at 27. "The Sherman Act, the court held,
applies to such a case only as involves an intent to control prices in states
other than that in which the activities sought to be censured are carried
on." Mr. Teller appears to have misspoken, for the case talks about
effect, not intent.
35301 U. S. 1, 81 L. Ed. 893, 57 S. Ct. 615 (1937).
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commerce. This case was met simply. Justice Stone admitted that
Congress could pass a "Sherman Act" condemning injuries to the shipment of interstate goods, but that thus far, such an intention had not
been manifested. Congress has only used part of its commerce power
in the Sherman Act of 1890.
Mr. Thurman Arnold's program to prosecute labor under the Sherman
Act when the union was promoting "improper" purposes was throttled
by the Apex case.36 High on his list of improper purposes sits the
jurisdictional controversy between unions. The closed shop, however,
is not on the list. After the Apex case, Mr. Arnold declared that if the
end sought by the union was proper (such as the closed shop desired
by labor in the Apex case), the Court would proceed to look at the
effect upon competition, as they did; but that if the end was improper
(such as getting the jobs of another union), the Court would say that
the effect upon competition was immaterial.
At first glance, it is hard to see why the applicability of the Sherman
Act should depend upon the reason trade is restrained. Mr. Arnold's
position can be sustained only on the theory that the statute is a
broad declaration of policy by Congress-a code to strike down improper
activities detrimental to the best interests of the country at large.37 The
Apex case, however, contained no language supporting Mr. Arnold's
interpretation, and subsequent decisions have proved him wrong.3 8
What about closed shop contracts that substantially injure competition? Since the Apex case ignored the means used by labor and said
that the effect upon competition was the controlling factor, can we
differentiate between a contract for a closed shop which substantially
injures competition and a strike or boycott striving to force an employer
to sign that contract?3 9 Having voluntarily signed a contract, an
employer would not sue for treble damages, but the criminal prosecution
would still be available to the government. Labor, however, would
"'scream to high heaven" if such an action were instigated. Justice
Douglas has subsequently said that "any combination which tampers
with price is engaged in unlawful activity." 40 Union leaders, nevertheless, want their contracts to be sui generis, and ask all the benefits of
the approach in the Apex case without this possible detriment.
The Apex opinion left federal control of labor through the Sherman
4 1
Act with little or no punch at all, and United States v. Hutcheson
put a large glove on that already ineffective left hand. Let us now
consider what Justice Frankfurter said in the latter case, and then reexamine the Apex doctrine under this new light.
"6See ARNOLD, THE BOTTLENECK OF BusINEss (1940). See also an interesting commentary on this publication: McLaughlin, BottZenecks (Union
Made Included) (1941) 8 U. OF Cm. L. REV. 215.
37See note 4, supra.
"Especially United States v. Hutclieson, 312 U. S.219, 85 L. Ed. 788,
61 S.Ct. 463 (1941), infra page 213 et seq. (Sherman Act inapplicable ,to
activity prompted by jurisdictional strife).
" Cavers, Labor v. The Sherman Act (1941) 8 U. oF Cm. L. REv. 246.
"0310 U. S. 150, 84 L. Ed. 1129, 60 S. Ct. 811 (1940). (United States v.
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.)
41 312 U. S.219, 85 L. Ed. 788, 61 S. Ct. 463 (1941).
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UNITED STATES V. HUTCHESON

For years two branches of the American Federation of Labor have
quarreled over which group has the right to perform the work of erecting and dismantling machinery. The Carpenters' Union traces its
ancestry to the Millwrights, who did the repairing of the wooden paddles
for mills run by water power. They contend that this" history forces
the conclusion that they should service machinery although it is now
made of metal rather than wood. The Machinists parry this contention
with their title. A compromise between the two factions was reached
in 1932, but within three weeks, Mr. Hutcheson decided that the Carpenters had been short-changed, and repudiated the agreement. 42, The
jurisdictional warfare continued.
Anheuser-Busch Brewery found itself involved in one of the battles
between the rival unions. The Brewery contracted with Borsari Tank
Corporation for the erection of additional buildings, and a lessee of
the Brewery, apparently by coincidence, entered a contract to have an
additional office building erected on the leased premises about the same
time. At this strategic moment, the Carpenters demanded the job of
handling the machinery in the Brewery, and upon the company's refusal
to fire the Machinists, they called a strike and requested union members
and their friends to refrain from buying Anheuser-Busch beer. The
strike stopped all new construction with considerable loss to the Brewery,
the Tank 43Corporation, and the complete stranger to the controversy,
the lessee.

Thurman Arnold prosecuted under the Sherman Act. Recalling for
the moment the Apex decision, Justice Stone's reasoning would seem to
acquit the defendants here. The Hutcheson case44 involved peaceful
striking, picketing, and boycotting, and no injury to competition resulted. Justice Stone perceived this easy, conventional solution, and
in a concurring opinion, held that his "interstate market" test defeated
the indictment. Furthermore the conflict was purely local and involved
no intent to control interstate markets, so the First Coronado case
doctrine would exonerate the defendants. Even the boycott cases would
hardly censure their activity because the boycott here was not prosecuted seriously.
Justice Frankfurther and the majority, however, had other ideas.
Three approaches to labor controversies versus anti-monopoly legislation have been discovered thus far: the "intent toward commerce" test
of the Coronado decisions, the "means" test of the boycott cases, and
the "effect" test of the Apex opinion. Only the purpose was questionable
in the Hutcheson case-the jurisdictional strife. The Court, however,
was unwilling to follow along with Mr. Arnold and to use the Sherman
Act to condemn labor controversies unappealing to the Court (or probably more accurately, unappealing to Thurman Arnold). Justice Frank' 2,Stefferi, Labor Activities in Restraint of Trade: The Hutcheson Case
(1941) 36 ILL. L. Rxv. 1, 6. See also: Steffen, Labor Activities in Restraint
of Trade: The Apex Case (1941) 50 YALE L. 5. 787.
,3 Incidentally, the union members of other branches of the A. P. of L.
were so displeased with this jurisdictional squabble that the picket line
was passed daily by many union members. See Steffen, supra note 42, 36
ILL L. REv. 1 at 9 (1941).
"United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U. S. 219, 85 L. Ed. 788, 61 S. Ct. 463
(1941).
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furter chose to throw his hands up in the air and to declare that Congress, instead of having an intent in the Sherman Act to let the Courts
work out a program for the good of the nation as a whole, 45 had an
intent in the Norris-La Guardia Act to protect labor. The intent, it
was held, must be read back into the Sherman Act to exempt labor from
the operation of anti-monopoly legislation.
The technique used by the Justice is very interesting. First he interprets the Norris-La Guardia Act to amend the Clayton Act. As will be
recalled, the Duplex case 48 held that a labor dispute must exist between
an employer and his employees before the anti-injunction section of the
Clayton Act comes into operation. Since the Norris-La Guardia Act
says there shall be "no injunction in a labor dispute" which can be found
whether the proximate relation of employer-employee exists or not,
Justice Frankfurter interprets this latest statute to amend the Clayton
Act and to overrule the Duplex case. 47 Then he applied the Clayton Act
to the Hutcheson case and discovered that the catch-all clause says that
nothing herein contained shall be "held to be violations of any law of
the United States.

' 48

Conclusion: the Sherman Act is inapplicable.

Restated, the reasoning goes like this. The Norris-La Guardia Act
talks only about injunctions, but it demonstrates a Congressional policy
which calls for a re-examination of the Clayton Act, which talked about
injunctions and also the anti-trust laws. The catch-all clause of the
Clayton Act indicates that that which cannot be enjoined cannot violate
the Sherman Act. So if the activity is unenjoinable under the NorrisLa Guardia Act, it is unpunishable under the Sherman Act, for conduct
on the part of labor which is not subject to injunction should not "in a
criminal proceeding become the road to prison." By inference, the same
reasoning would preclude an action for treble49damages-the road should
not contain potholes of civil liability, either.
The Apex case suggested that a "rule of reason" was applicable to
labor activities under the Sherman Act. While the "rule" may be different from that expressed in the cases concerning business when applied
to labor,50 Justice Stone did expressly say that, under some circumstances and in some situations, labor could be plagued by the AntiMonopoly Statute. The Hutcheson opinion, however, denies the Court
the power to distinguish the reasonable from the unreasonable or the
"licit from the illicit", although the language quoted earlier in this paper
from the Clayton Act would intimate that Congress certainly had
,-Mr. Arnold's theory. See page 212, supra.
16 Note 10, supra.
,7The Norris-La Guardia Act, however, says nothing about the Clayton
Act.
48Set out, supra page 207.

10 Observe how Justice Stone comforted capital by suggesting state

remedies still available. Part of Mr. Frankfurter's opinion suggests that
the states would be in contravention of federal policy in granting relief.
soCf. with the Apex case such cases as United States v. Socony-Vacuum
Oil Co., 310 U. S.150, 84 L. Ed. 1129, 60 S.Ct. 811 (1940), rehearing denied,
310 U. S.658, 84 L. Ed. 421, 60 S.Ct. 1091 (1940); United States v. United
Shoe Machinery, 247 U. S. 32, 62 L. Ed. 968, 38 S. Ct. 473 (1917); United
States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U. S. 106, 55 L. Ed. 663, 31 S. Ct. 632
(1910); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U. S. 1, 55 L. Ed. 619, 31 S.Ct.
502 (1910).
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"proper" labor activities in mind.-'
Aside from quarreling with this expansion of the Clayton Act, let us
return to a consideration of the applicability of the Norris-La Guardia
Act to anti-trust prosecutions.52 The injunction has always been a thorn
in the side of labor. Picketing, striking, and boycotting are effective
because they place pressure upon the employer in his every day business.
They are tortious because they are injurious, but if for a proper purpose,
and if primary, the tort is justified.5 3 Many courts, however, have
issued temporary injunctions, determined the cause, found for the
laborers and dissolved the injunction months or years later. These were
a victory for capital, although the decisions went to labor, for the injunction stopped the vital pressure by the labor union at the height of
the dispute. Legislators realized that it would be fairer in close cases
to let the union continue its activity and to leave the employer merely
his remedy by way of damages. Anti-injunction statutes were born.
The anti-injunction statutes aimed to help labor by ruling out of the
contest an unfair weapon-the injunction. These statutes do not say
that labor is beyond reproach, and damages remain for the wronged
employer.
Just as damages and injunctions are different- types of relief, so,
too, the criminal prosecution is a different form of sanction available to
the State under the Sherman Act. Justice Frankfurter, nevertheless,
declared that the anti-injunction section in the Norris Act should be
read to extinguish criminal prosecutions of labor under the Sherman
Act, despite the fact that the Norris Act lacked the catch-all clause of
Section 20 of the Clayton Act. Criticism of this technique has been
showered upon the Justice, and the tomatoes were made jucier by the
fact that Mr. Frankfurter himself declared in 1930 that the proposed
Norris-La Guardia Act was solely an anti-injunction measure! '
That Congress intended injunctions based upon the Sherman Act to be
eliminated by the Norris Act cannot be successfully disputed, but considerable doubt exists whether they intended to say "labor can do no
wrong."
Justice Frankfurter could have avoided much criticism. Justice
Brandeis wrote the dissent in the Duplex case,55 and of late, the
5
Justice Frankfurter said the "licit and the illicit under Section 20
are not to be distinguished by any judgment regarding the wisdom or unwisdom, the rightness or wrongness, the selfishness or unselfishness of the
end of which the particular union activities are the means." He does not
mention Section 6 of the Clayton Act which refers to th6 "legitimate
objects" of labor unions. Furthermore, examine Section 20 itself. The
justice's
conclusion is very debatable.
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Justice Frankfurter started with the Norris Act and worked back to

the Sherman Act. In his concurring opinion, Justice Stone starts with the
Sherman Act and goes no further, for he finds it inapplicable under his
test in the Apex case. For an interesting comparison of these two techniques, see Tunks, supra not( 11 at 977.
"' 1 TELLER, LABOR DIsPUTEs AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING (1940) Sec. 136.
' RAKFuRTER and GsmE, TiE LABOR INJUNCTION (1930) 222. "No such

interpretation is possible for-the proposed bill, which explicitly applies
only to the authority of the United States courts 'to issue any restraining
order or injunction.' All other remedies in federal courts and all remedies
in state courts remain available."
" See discussion, supra page 208.
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Supreme Court has experienced little difficulty in making his dissents
and those of Justice Holmes the law of the land. Why bother with the
Norris Act? Why not just say that the Clayton Act removed labor
activity from the Sherman Act? Perhaps other members of the Court
were unwilling to be so bold. The criticism, however, has fallen upon
the back of Justice Frankfurter.
One could continue to criticize for many pages"6 either the result in
the Hutcheson case57 or the technique used by the Court. 8 More
worthwhile, however, is a consideration of the law as declared. Are
there any shreds of the Sherman Act which still apply to labor activities ?
The Hutcheson case may warrant the conclusion that the Sherman
Act has been written off the books as far as labor is concerned 5" with
one notable exception-where labor conspires with capital as was done
in the Brims case.59 A dictum suggests that union combinations with
non-union groups to effect control of commodity markets will still be
unlawful under the anti-trust laws.6 0 The Apex doctrine is inapplicable
to labor acting alone, for the Hutcheson case says that laborers playing
by themselves cannot violate the Sherman Act. Labor can use all the
low punches it wishes in squabbles, either with business or with other
branches of itself. If capital joins the game, however, the rule book
must come out, and the "rules of the game" followed.
In applying the Norris-La Guardia Act to other fact patterns the
Court has said that the statute "does not concern itself with the background or motives of the dispute."'" It should follow that this interpretation carries over into cases involving the applicability of the Sherman
Act. One authority, however, has suggested that the Sherman Act is
still applicable if the activity has nothing to do with the "terms
' 62
or conditions of employment" or concerns "restrictive union rules.
The Hutcheson case gives little support to this view in light of the
language quoted above.6 3 If labor is prompted to demonstrate, the controversy will undoubtedly constitute a "labor dispute" and the Sherman
6 4
Act will be inapplicable regardless of the subject matter of the dispute.
"For example, the Court's failure to mention Section 6 of the Clayton
Act, set out supra page 207, and noted supra note 51.
57 Steffen, supra note 42; Teller, supra note 24.
58 Cavers, supra note 39; Steffen, supra note 42; Gregory, supra note
33, and especially his later Comment (1941) 8 U. OF Cm. L. REV. 503,
and Caver's few words, Comment (1941) 8 U. OF Cm. L REv. 516; Teller,
supra note 24. Contrast a justification of the Court's position: Nathanson
& Wirtz, The Hutcheson Case: Another View (1941) 36 ILL. L. REV. 41.
(See also Steffen's rebuttal, p. 58).
r, Teller, supra note 24, reaches this conclusion in his introduction!
51 Supra page 209, note 19.
11"So long as a union acts in its self-interest and does not combine
with non-labor groups ..
" 312 U. S. 219, 232, 85 L. Ed. 788, 793, 61 S. Ct.
463, 466 (1941), citing U. S. v. Brims, 272 U S. 549, 71 L. Ed. 403, 47 S. Ct.
169 (1926). See Comment (1941) 8 U. oF Cm. L. REV. 503 (written by
Charles 0. Gregory).
61 New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co., 303 U. S. 552, 561, 82
L. Ed. 1012, 1016, 58 S .Ct. 703, 707 (1938). See also Teller, supra note 24, at
41, n. 78.
" Tunks, supra note 11 at 999.
"5Supra, page 213.
64 Milk Wagon Drivers' Union v. Lake Valley Farm Products, 311 U. S.
91, 85 L. Ed. 63, 61 S. Ct. 122 (1940).
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COMMENTS

The Norris Act sets up a statutory procedure which must be explicitly
followed to obtain an injunction when "fraud or violence" is involved.
What about the addition of these two elements to an anti-trust prosecution of labor? The granting -of an injunction under the Sherman Act
might be held to be a short cut of these statutory requirements. Damages
and criminal prosecution,' however, should still be available in this
limited field if the test of the Apex case is satified.65
Justice Frankfurter's opinion in the Hutcheson case has been sharply
criticized as "judicial legislation."6 6 In another sense, however, does
not the decision ask Congress to legislate?6 7 Mr. Frankfurter's technique
might be paraphrased as follows: "The Norris-La Guardia Act indicates
that the Sherman Act should not be applied to labor. We of the Court
have no tools with which to control labor. You, Congress, must, therefore, give us something that specifically deals with labor if you want to
control their activities that violate the spirit of a competitive society."
Of course, judicial legislation can be done negatively by ignoring the
true import of a statute.6 8 The position of labor under the Sherman
Act, however, has never been clear, and the opinion might well be interpreted as telling Congress that it should enact new legislation if federal
control of union activities is desired. The employers have been given
their medicine in the form of the Wagner Act and the "free speech"
cases;6 9 a "companion bill" giving labor "glass pockets" too may be in
order. 70 Under the present state of anti-monopoly legislation versus
labor activities, new legislation is needed, for the old has failed to prove
satisfactory.
Let us now turn to a consideration of the one remaining problem.
What is a labor union? When is a group entitled to the protection of the
Hutcheson case from the Sherman Act?
FISHERMEN ARE BUSIN4ESS MEN
Not long after the Hutcheson case the Court was called upon to determine the applicability of the Sherman Act to a controversy between
a salmon packer and fishermen. If the activities of the fishermen's
"union" in Columbia River Packers v. Hinton7l provoked a "labor dispute," then they were non-enjoinable under the Sherman Act, according
to the Hutcheson doctrine. The Court, however, found no employeremployee relation, no dispute between labor and capital, and granted
the injunction.
65The Apex case involved violence, but there was no injury to competition.
06 Justice Robert's so characterized it in his dissent to the Hutcheson
case.
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Cf. herein Nathanson & Wirtz, supra note 57, at 56.

68 For example, the brush-off given to the express words of Washington's
anti-injunction statute in Safeway Stores v. Retail Clerks' Union, 184 Wash.

322, 51 P. (2d) 372 (1935).
60American Federation of Labor v. Swing, 312 U. S. 321, 85 L. Ed. 855.
61 S. Ct. 568 (1941); Thornhil v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88, 84 L. Ed. 1093, 60
S. Ct. 736 (1940); Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union, 301 U. S.468, 478
(1937).
0
See William Hard, Should Labor Have Glass Pockets (1942) READER'S
DIGEsT, January, page 1. See also Walter Merritt, The Open or Closed
Shop for War Industries? (1942) BuLLE
oF AMICA'S TowN AEE
G
OF THE Am, Vol. 7, No. 22.
711315 U. S.143, 62 Sup. Ct. 520, 86 L. Ed. Adv. Opinions 441 (1942).
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Columbia River Packers purchased fish both from the members of
the fishermen's "union" and from "scabs." The "union" demanded
that the plaintiff company buy its fish only from "union" fishermen, and
upon the packers' refusal to comply, the company was boycotted. The
Court said that this was merely a "dispute among business men over
the terms of a contract for the sale of fish," 7 2 that the fishermen's
"union" was trying to monopolize the market, and that the fishermen
were merely "independent contractors" selling fish rather than services.
The Court said that the purpose of the Norris-La Guardia Act is to
protect labor from coercion, not to control the sale of commodities
(fish). This thought throws doubt upon the propriety of the tests
used by the Court to determine whether a labor dispute existed. Should
the Court talk about agency (employees vs. independent contractors)
or sales (sale of services vs. sale of goods), or should the justices look
at the economic positions of the contestants? The latter might well be
preferable, for labor problems are somewhat sui generis. In fact, does
not the Hutcheson case almost admit the impropriety of applying general sanctions (such as the Sherman Act) to labor controversies? The
fisherman is very close to the piece-work laborer. The packer's refusal
to purchase only from the "union" is very similar to an employer's denial
of the closed shop. Labor activity to foster the latter, however, is unenjoinable. 3
Of course, the Court has to draw some line between "labor disputes"
and strife between two economic groups. A contrary decision in the
Columbia River Packers case would have presented the problem of the
extent to which agricultural organizations could go to raise prices
offered by produce dealers. It is submitted, however, that if the Hutcheson case is correct, and that if the prevention of coercion of labor is
the purpose of the Norri§-La Guardia Act, then the Court should approach problems similar to the Columbia River Packers situation on the
basis of their analogy to labor controversies, rather than by applying
the traditional tests of agency and sales.
ROBERT A. PURDUE.
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Sup. Ct. 521 (1942).

,1 Apex Hosiery v. Leader, 310 U. S. 469, 84 L. Ed. 1311, 60 S. Ct. 982
(1940).

